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THE PATH TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY 
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS
Régis Bismuth1
ABSTRACT
Recent times have been rich in events highlighting the shortcomings of 
mechanisms for dealing with sovereign debt crises, especially when they involve 
private creditors. Both the Greek financial debacle and the spate of litigation arising 
from Argentina’s 2001 default have exposed the obstacles to both the successful 
implementation of restructuring plans and the attempts to block the legal actions 
brought by private creditors not willing to participate in the restructuring of sover-
eign debt. Given this seeming disarray and the impediments to the establishment 
of sovereign insolvency proceedings, the loan contract emerged as one of the most 
suitable instrument to ensure an orderly resolution of sovereign insolvency issues. 
In this context, it seems reasonable to examine the possible emergence of an “inter-
national public policy” for sovereign debt, the cornerstone of which would be the 
loan contract concluded between the State and its creditors.
Keywords: Collective Action Clauses (CACs) – European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) – International pubic policy – Sovereign febt – Vulture funds
The year 2012 will no doubt go down in history in the annals of sovereign 
debt given the record value of the Greek debt restructuring implemented through 
debt exchange of more than two-hundred billion euros2. The unprecedented mag-
nitude and intensity of the debt crisis faced by the euro area has even led some of 
its member states to seek the financial assistance of the IMF3, an option considered 
shameful a few weeks before the adoption of the first aid package for Greece4.
1 Professor of Public Law at the University of Poitiers (Professeur agrégé de droit public). Ph.D. (Sor-
bonne), LL.M. (Columbia Law School). The author is grateful to Tim Francis, postgraduate student at 
the American Graduate School in Paris, for his useful comments on previous drafts of this article. 
2 ZETTELMEYER Jeromin, TREBESCH Christoph, GULATI Mitu, The Greek Debt Exchange: An 
Autopsy, September 2012, p. 16, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com>; INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND, Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s 
Legal and Policy Framework, April 2013, p. 6.
3 On the financial assistance of the IMF to the euro zone member States, see, BISMUTH Régis, 
“L’assistance financière du FMI aux États membres de la zone euro : De l’inconcevable au conventionnel 
(ou comment «conventionnaliser» l’inconcevable)”, Revue des Affaires Européennes, 2012, n° 4, pp. 
747-757.
4 Replying to a question asking whether there was something preventing Greece from “knock[ing] on 
the door of the IMF”, Jean-Claude Trichet, the former Governor of the European Central Bank, replied: 
I do not want to enter into some kind of fantasy scenario […]. [We] are, in a way, in a 
system which is very different from the usual environment. When you are inside the 
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While the euro zone may have been at the center of the world’s attention, 
the Greek crisis should not eclipse other developments that have been particularly 
informative about the treatment of sovereign insolvency. Indeed, recent years have 
also been marked by the litigation arising out of the Argentinean default of 2001, 
which has given a comprehensive overview of possible legal strategies adopted by 
private creditors in order to recoup as much of their investments as possible. Some 
of these creditors declined Argentina’s exchange offers and referred the matter to 
the courts of the State of New York that had jurisdiction pursuant to the agreement 
regulating sovereign bond issues5 or decided to initiate arbitral proceedings under 
the auspices of the ICSID Convention6. Measures of enforcement or of constraint 
against Argentina’s assets were also sought in Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom7. The litigation has even reached the International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Sea which ordered the release of an Argentine frigate detained in Ghana 
following a successful application by one of Argentina’s creditors8. This multifac-
eted and disorderly litigation stemming from the Argentinean default is indicative 
of the absence of a formal and centralized sovereign bankruptcy mechanism and 
clearly shows that sovereign debt crises cannot be treated as mere extensions of 
financial crises9.
A comparison between the legal framework regulating sovereign insol-
vency and private insolvency reveals three key areas in which differences should 
euro area, you are helped by the very fact of belonging to the euro area, and you are 
helped considerably; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Introductory Statement with 
Q&A – Press Conference, 4 March 2010, available at <www.ecb.europa.eu>.
The aid package for Greece was eventually concluded in early May 2010. See, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Greece on €30 Billion Stand- By Ar-
rangement, Press Release No. 10/176, 2 May 2010.
5 On this litigation, see infra I.A.2.
6 Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 4 August 2011; Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 8 February 2013. See also, Giovanni Ale-
manni and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8.
7 See, Cass. (1ère ch.), 22 November 2012, C.11.0688F (Belgium Cour de Cassation); Cass. Civ. 1ère, 
28 September 2011, n° 09-72.057; Cass. Civ. 1ère, 28 March 2013, n° 10-25.938, 11-10.450 et 11-13.323 
(French Cour de Cassation); NML Capital Limited (Appellant) v. Republic of Argentina (Respondent) 
[2011] UKSC 31.
8 ITLoS, “ARA Libertad” (Argentina v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Request for the prescription of provi-
sional measures, Order, 15 December 2012.
9 On the links between financial and sovereign debt crises, see, REINHART Carmen M., ROGOFF 
Kenneth S., “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis”, American Economic Review, vol. 101, n° 5, 2011, 
pp. 1676-1706. It is noteworthy to mention that, to some extent, the financial industry is linked to sover-
eign debt. This is the case for valuation techniques such as the “Capital Asset Pricing Model” (CAPM) 
according to which the risk-free interest rate should be based on government bonds (JENKINSON 
Tim, “Regulation and the Cost of Capital”, in CREW Michael, PARKER David (eds.), International 
Handbook on Economic Regulation, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2006, p. 147). This is 
also the case for Basel prudential banking standards (BISMUTH Régis, “La réforme de l’encadrement 
prudentiel des banques par le Comité de Bâle, reflet des tensions entre les différents espaces de régu-
lation financière”, in DELION André, VIDAL Laurent (dir.), Annales de la Régulation – Les réformes 
des régulations financières, Paris, IRJS Editions, 2013, pp. 173-195).
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be noted10. Firstly, there is no preventative mechanism (ex ante regulation) or mul-
tilateral rule of international law limiting sovereign borrowing, such as prudential 
regulations restricting the level indebtedness of financial institutions. Apart from 
balanced-budget constitutional rules relevant at the domestic level11 and the fiscal 
compact12 adopted by the member states of the euro area13 with a solely regional 
outreach, the principles recently adopted by UNCTAD aimed at the promotion 
of responsible sovereign lending and borrowing14 constitute the only (soft law) 
achievement in this field. Secondly, there is no international institution with the 
competences to act as a genuine lender of last resort in a situation of sovereign 
insolvency, in the way that central banks at the domestic (or European) level in-
tervene against a potential drying up of liquidity in situations of market turmoil. 
The IMF is not vested with such authority to unilaterally intervene in the markets 
and its financial assistance is accessible after the conclusion of an agreement with 
one of its members. Third, there is no curative mechanism (ex post regulation) 
establishing a formal and centralized procedure addressing the consequences of 
sovereign insolvencies, and potentially leading to receivership or compulsory liq-
uidation15. Despite several proposals16, the establishment of such procedures is 
unlikely to occur since it would involve the decision for States to transfer core 
sovereign competences in the fields of public finance and tax policy to an interna-
tional body. Consequently, under international law, a sovereign State cannot be in 
liquidation or bankruptcy – it can only default on its debt. The default constitutes 
a critical event from which creditors will seek to recoup their investment through 
more or less centralized processes. The prevalent disorder in sovereign insolven-
cies is mainly the result of the uncoordinated coexistence of different classes of 
creditors (banks, investment funds, individuals, international financial institutions, 
10 For a different perspective, see, BOLTON Patrick, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/03/13, January 2003, p. 19 et seq.
11 JEAN-ANTOINE Benoît, “La règle d’équilibre ou ‘règle d’or’, approche compare”, Revue Fran-
çaise de Finances Publiques, n° 117, 2012, p. 55 et seq.
12 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.
13 ALLEMAND Frédéric, MARTUCCI Francesco, “La nouvelle gouvernance économique euro-
péenne”, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 2012, n° 2, pp. 407-455.
14 UNCTAD, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 10 January 
2012, available at <www.unctad.info>. See also, GOLDMANN Matthias, Responsible Sovereign Lend-
ing and Borrowing: The Views From Domestic Jurisdictions, February 2012, available at <www.unctad.
info>.
15 It was already noted in one of the first courses at the Hague Academy: 
la position particulière de l’État s’oppose à celle d’un individu, ou à celle d’une entité 
corporative qui ne jouit d’aucune autorité publique, devra être prise en considération. 
Un État ne peut être mis en faillite comme un individu, et ses biens répartis entre ses 
créanciers ? Un État ne peut être liquidé comme une société de commerce, et on ne 
peut mettre fin à son existence, simplement parce qu’il est insolvable. Un État […] 
existe dans le but de remplir envers ses membres des devoirs qui sont inaliénables”;
 FISCHER WILLIAMS John, “Le droit international et les obligations financières internationales qui 
naissent d’un contrat”, Recueil des Cours, vol. 1, 1923, p. 342-343.
16 For some recent proposals, see, IMF, supra note 2, p. 37.
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States, etc.) with different lending policies and objectives (financial performance 
for private creditors, financing for development or structural adjustment program 
for public creditors).
It should not be inferred from this complex picture that there is a com-
plete lack of regulatory processes aimed at an orderly management of sovereign 
debt crises. Some international institutions (including the IMF) or informal bodies 
(such as the Paris Club or the London Club) have occasionally led some level of 
debt restructuring. However, this institutional framework remains too diffuse and 
decentralized to feasibly constitute the framework of consistent collective insol-
vency proceedings for sovereign States17. The most effective and promising ave-
nue for managing sovereign debt crises seems to lie in the loan contract itself, the 
terms of which crystallize the creditors concerns18. Besides, the evolution of con-
tract practices following sovereign defaults, in particular through the integration or 
amendment of clauses on renegotiation and restructuring, is clearly evidence that 
the loan contract constitutes the keystone of the borrowing process19. Therefore, 
in the absence of a satisfying collective mechanism, it is through the loan contract 
that an orderly management of sovereign debt crises is conceivable. 
Within this framework, the notion of “public policy” (and, by extension, 
the notion of “public policy for sovereign debt contracts”) adequately encapsulates 
this need for a more disciplined approach to sovereign debt crises. The notion of 
“public policy” – also known in French as “ordre public” – fulfills different func-
tions according to the context in which it is used. In the field of contract law or 
treaty law, freedom of contract or of treaty-making is restricted by public policy 
(known as jus cogens in international law)20. In administrative law, the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms is subject to public policy objectives21. In private interna-
tional law, the “public policy exception” allows a court to bar the recognition of 
a foreign judgment or disregard the rules of the foreign law applicable by virtue 
of the conflict-of-law rule, whereby the foreign judgment or the application of the 
foreign law would be contrary to the public policy of the forum22. This notion also 
exists in the field of international arbitration in which it is referred to as “interna-
tional” or “transnational public policy”23.
17 However, see, VON BOGDANDY Armin, GOLDMANN Matthias, “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 
as Exercises of International Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign Insolvency Law”, 
2013, 36 p., available at <http://papers.ssrn.com>.
18 For an in-depth study of contract practices, see, CHOI Stephen J., GULATI Mitu, POSNER Eric. 
A., “The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds”, Journal of Legal Analysis, vol. 4, n° 1, 
2012, pp. 131-179.
19 Ibid., p. 152 et seq.
20 For instance, in contract law, Article 6 of the French Civil Code indeed provides that “statutes 
relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by private agreements”. According to 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law” (Article 53).
21 WALINE Jean, Droit administratif, Paris, Dalloz, 22e éd., 2008, p. 325 et seq.
22 MAYER Pierre, HEUZÉ Vincent, Droit international privé, Paris, Montchrestien, 10e éd., 2010, p. 
149 et seq., p. 287 et seq.
23 LALIVE Pierre, “Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et arbitrage international”, 
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These different functions of “public policy” are of special interest in the 
context of sovereign debt insofar as they allow for the identification of three key 
characteristics of their orderly management. First, the notion of “public policy”, 
which refers to the requirement to maintain the public order and the fundamental 
values of a given society or social body24, involves the consideration of compelling 
interests that are not necessarily those of the contractors (and particularly the cred-
itors) when it comes to sovereign insolvency issues. Second, “public policy” also 
restricts the freedom of contract and such restrictions are externally defined by the 
legislator or identified by the judge, thereby limiting the possibility of requesting 
the enforcement of the loan contract in case of default. Third, the content of the 
“public policy” varies depending on both time and space. It also varies across time 
because it is progressively shaped by the legislator and the judge in response to the 
new requirements of the social body. It varies also across space since the values and 
interests that the public policy reflect are not necessarily shared by all legal orders. 
Therefore, it could be useful to determine whether new public policy ob-
jectives applicable to sovereign debt contracts have emerged. An analysis of the 
current legal framework raises some doubts as to the existence of a de jure “public 
policy for sovereign debt contracts” externally defined by the legislator or identi-
fied by the judge to ensure an orderly management of sovereign debt crises (I.). 
However, this should not overshadow several initiatives aimed at the integration of 
such public policy objectives into sovereign debt contracts (II.).
I. THE UNCERTAIN EXISTENCE OF AN EXTERNAL DE JURE 
“PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS”
The existence of public policy objectives imposing an orderly manage-
ment of sovereign insolvencies would allow the courts to disregard some contrac-
tual provisions or to interpret them in a manner consistent with such objectives. An 
analysis of the relevant case law reveals that domestic courts have been reluctant 
to identify a public policy that could potentially impact the application or the in-
terpretation of sovereign debt contracts (A.). The position of domestic courts does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such public policy would not be able to 
emerge since some legislative initiatives indicate a recognition – an albeit incom-
plete one – of such objectives (B.).
Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1986, n° 3, pp. 329-374; FORTEAU Mathias, “L’ordre public ‘transnational’ 
ou ‘réellement international’ – L’ordre public international face à l’enchevêtrement croissant du droit 
international privé et du droit international public”, Journal du Droit International, 2011, pp. 3-49.
24 “Public policy” is also defined as the “principles and standards regarded by the legislature or by the 
courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society” (Black’s Law Dictionnary, 
9th ed., 2009, p. 1267). See also, DEUMIER Pascale, REVET Thierry, “Ordre public”, in ALLAND 
Denis, RIALS Stéphane (dir.), Dictionnaire de la culture juridique, Paris, PUF, 2003, p. 1120.
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A. THE RELUCTANCE OF DOMESTIC COURTS TOWARDS A PUB-
LIC POLICY FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS
1. A Sovereign Debt Litigation Interfering With Debt Restructuring Pro-
cesses
A better understanding of sovereign debt litigation before domestic courts 
requires a preliminary presentation of the main developments of sovereign bor-
rowing. Until the early 1980s, the majority of private sector lenders were banks25. 
In the case of restructuring proceedings, these institutional investors, due to their 
relatively small number, were able to cooperate informally among themselves 
in the “London Club”, which has echoed the “Paris Club” in gathering together 
sovereign creditors26. In the 1980s, debt flowed to sovereign borrowers mainly 
through bond markets27. This development has had practical consequences on the 
management of sovereign insolvencies since the adoption of a restructuring plan 
involving a debt rescheduling or a partial debt cancellation requires an amendment 
to sovereign bonds contracts. These decisions, unless otherwise provided, require 
unanimity and therefore are more likely to be taken by a small number of banks 
than a plurality of bondholders.
The difficulty in restructuring sovereign bond issues also generates an in-
centive for some creditors to engage in judicial activism. Indeed, instead of agree-
ing to a reasonable debt restructuring which usually implies a financial loss, these 
creditors may prefer to initiate legal proceedings before domestic courts in order 
to recoup the whole value of their investment. These claims are facilitated by the 
fact that States usually waive their jurisdictional immunities within the framework 
of international bond issues28. Some of the creditors declining to participate in 
restructuring procedures (also labeled as “holdouts” or “holdout creditors” in legal 
and financial jargon)29 are investment funds (also known as “vulture funds”) that 
have purchased distressed sovereign debt at very low or derisory prices after a de-
fault (or because of the dubious solvency of the creditor in the hope of recovering 
the amount of the nominal value after lengthy and expensive proceedings they can 
afford)30. For instance, such claims have proliferated in the context of the Argen-
25 AUDIT Mathias, “Introduction générale – Dissection du risque souverain”, in AUDIT Mathias (dir.), 
Insolvabilité des États et dette souveraine, Paris, LGDJ, 2011, p. 6 et seq.
26 For more details, see, RIEFFEL Lex, Restructuring Sovereign Debt – The Case for Ad Hoc Machin-
ery, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, p. 56 et seq.
27 This development of sovereign borrowing through bond markets in the 1980s is nothing new in the 
history since bond markets were already highly appreciated at the end of the 19th century. See, WRIGHT 
Mark J. L., “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Problems and Prospects”, Harvard Business Law Review, 
vol. 2, 2012, p. 165 et seq.
28 CHOI, GULATI, POSNER, supra note 18, p. 139 and p. 156-157.
29 GOLDMAN Samuel E., “Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring”, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, vol. 5, 2000, p. 
159 et seq.
30 WAUTELET Patrick, “Vulture Funds, Creditors and Sovereign Debtors: How to Find a Balance?”, 
in AUDIT Mathias (dir.), Insolvabilité des États et dette souveraine, Paris, LGDJ, 2011, p. 103 et seq.; 
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tinean debt crisis31. These holdout strategies seriously interfere with restructuring 
processes, both from the point of view of the debtor State unwilling to face multi-
ple court proceedings and that of other creditors accepting the restructuring and a 
financial loss but unwilling to receive a less favorable treatment than the holdouts.
2. The Unsuccessful Public Policy Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation
In this context, domestic courts have been asked to regulate the poten-
tial harmful effects of holdout strategies by identifying public policy objectives 
impacting the application or the interpretation of sovereign debt contracts. This 
issue came to the fore in an extremely clear way in the case NML v. Argentina, in 
particular within the framework of the decision of October 26, 2012 of the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit32.
In 1994, Argentina completed bond issues pursuant to a Fiscal Agency 
Agreement which included a Pari Passu Clause ensuring the protection of bond-
holders from subordination and stipulating that “[t]he Securities will constitute 
[…] direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Repub-
lic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. 
The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank 
at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated 
External Indebtedness”33. In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its debt by declaring a 
temporary moratorium on principal and interest payments. In order to restructure 
this debt, Argentina initiated two exchange offers in 2005 and 2010 with a substan-
tial haircut of about 75% of the face value. After these exchange offers, Argentina 
had eventually restructured about 91% of its defaulted foreign debt. Since then, 
it has made all principal and interests payments on its restructured debt but has 
refused to make payments to the holdouts representing about 9% of the defaulted 
debt34. The reluctant creditors, foremost among them the Cayman Islands-based in-
vestment fund NML Capital, filed a claim against Argentina in a New York federal 
district court. They alleged, inter alia, breach of the pari passu clause insofar as the 
full payments on the restructured debt lowered the rank of holdouts’ bonds.
In December 2011, a first partial summary judgment from the US District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that Argentina had breached 
its contractual obligations35. This judgment and similar decisions involving other 
creditors were challenged in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Argentina 
GIANSETTO Fanny, “Les fonds dits ‘vautours’ et la dette souveraine – Un nouvel enjeu de la régula-
tion financière”, Cahiers de Droit de l’Entreprise, November 2012, n° 6, p. 50 et seq.
31 HORNBECK J. F., Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the ‘Holdouts’, CRS Report 
for Congress, 6 February 2013, 17 p.
32 NML Capital, Ltd. et al., v. The Republic of Argentina (Docket No. 12 105(L)) (2d Circuit, October 
26, 2012).
33 The clause is cited in the Court of Appeals’ decision (supra note 32).
34 HORNBECK, supra note 31, p. 3 et seq. 
35 NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina (08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 
1708 (TPG)) (S.D.N.Y., December 7, 2011).
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argued that the pari passu clause was only a “boilerplate provision” 36 with “[t]he 
limited purpose […] in the sovereign context as it has been universally understood 
for over 50 years […] to provide protection from legal subordination or other dis-
criminatory legal ranking by preventing the creation of legal priorities by the sov-
ereign in favor of creditors holding particular classes of debt”37. It added that this 
clause “has […] never been understood by any market participant, to require that 
payment to one creditor requires payment to all”38.
Apart from the issue of the textual interpretation of the pari passu clause, 
Argentina also warned the court about the possible large-scale adverse consequenc-
es of a ruling requiring Argentina to make full payment to holdouts. It pointed 
out that there was a “public policy which favors voluntary debt restructurings and 
opposes the backdoor creation of unbargained-for contractual rights for holdout 
creditors seeking to “leverage” their positions by disrupting such restructurings”39. 
In this respect, Argentina invoked a public policy exception potentially impacting 
the application or the interpretation of sovereign debt contracts when they hinder 
the orderly management of sovereign debt crises. 
The federal court remained impervious to Argentina’s arguments by con-
fining itself to a literal interpretation of the pari passu clause and rejected the public 
policy exception. It curtly pointed out that “[i]n New York, a bond is a contract 
[…]. Thus, the parties’ dispute over the meaning of the Equal Treatment Provision 
presents a ‘simple question of contract interpretation’”40. The court also explained 
its choice not to take into consideration such public policy objectives by stressing 
that the function of the pari passu clause is precisely to ensure an equal treatment 
of creditors in the absence of centralized bankruptcy proceedings for sovereigns41. 
This position is consistent with a well established case-law of US courts since the 
mid-1980s42.
36 Brief of the Defendant-Appellant – The Republic of Argentina (Case No. 12 105(L)) (2d Circuit, 
March 21, 2012), p. 2.
37 Ibid., p. 34.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
39 Ibid., p. 4-5.
40 NML Capital, Ltd. et al., v. The Republic of Argentina, supra note 32, p. 16.
41 Ibid., p. 19 (“This specific constraint on Argentina as payor makes good sense in the context of sov-
ereign debt: when sovereigns default they do not enter bankruptcy proceedings where the legal rank of 
debt determines the order in which creditors will be paid. Instead, sovereigns can choose for themselves 
the order in which creditors will be paid. In this context, the Equal Treatment Provision prevents Ar-
gentina as payor from discriminating against the FAA Bonds in favor of other unsubordinated, foreign 
bonds”).
42 Especially since the decision of the same Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Allied II. (Allied 
Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985)). See, GATHII 
James Thuo, “The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and its Origins in Enforcement Litigation”, 
George Washington International Law Review, vol. 38, 2006, p. 254 (underlining that “as the sanctity of 
sovereign loan contracts became the reigning paradigm in sovereign debt litigation in the mid-1980s, the 
defenses to default and balancing considerations such as comity that once were traditionally available 
to sovereign debtors simultaneously withered away in subsequent litigation”). See also, ASIEDU-AK-
ROFI Harvey, “Banks, Bonds and the American Bench: Exercising Discretion to Discourage Rogue 
Sovereign Bond Litigation Claims”, Cambridge Student Law Review, 2011, pp. 42-61.
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However, the Government of the United States has taken a clear position in 
favor of Argentina. In April 2012, the Department of the Treasury and the Depart-
ment of State jointly submitted a brief advocating the recognition of public policy 
objectives and enjoining the court not to give full effect to the pari passu clause 
since the dispute involved “issues of vital public policy and legal importance to 
the United States that extend beyond the particular facts of this case”43. Following 
the decision of October 2012, Argentina requested a rehearing of the case, which 
was eventually denied in February 201344. Within the framework of this proce-
dure, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of State, once more, filed 
an amicus brief in which they were even more explicit about these public policy 
objectives45. They first argued that a strict interpretation of the pari passu clause 
could adversely impact the competitiveness of US financial markets. By stressing 
that “the decision could harm U.S. interests in promoting issuers’ use of New York 
law and preserving New York as a global financial jurisdiction”46 and that “[t]he 
decision could encourage issuers to issue debt in non-U.S. currencies in order to 
avoid the U.S. payments system, causing a detrimental effect on the systemic role 
of the U.S. dollar”47, the US Government intended to protect national interests and 
therefore promoted a kind of “domestic public policy” (although we may have 
doubts that the solution advocated is likely to attract investors and promote the 
competitiveness of US financial markets). The second set or arguments took a dif-
ferent approach by focusing more on an international perspective than a purely 
domestic one. The brief explains that a strict interpretation of the pari passu clause 
gives an incentive for creditors not to participate in sovereign debt restructurings 
and therefore encourages holdout strategies:
The effect [of the panel’s reasoning] could extend well 
beyond Argentina […]. [V]oluntary sovereign debt restructuring 
will become far more difficult if holdout creditors can use novel 
interpretations of boilerplate bond provisions to interfere with the 
performance of a restructuring plan accepted by most creditors, and 
to greatly tilt incentives away from voluntary debt exchanges and 
negotiated restructuring in the first place. A sovereign’s potential 
resistance to paying nonexchanged debt is a critical tool in its efforts 
to negotiate broad creditor support for restructuring. This leverage 
will be lost if creditors believe that a holdout strategy will eventu-
ally result in substantial or full payment. If enough creditors adopt 
43 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal (Case No. 12 105(L)) 
(2d Circuit, April 4, 2012).
44 NML Capital, Ltd. et al., v. The Republic of Argentina (Case No. 12 105(L)) (2d Circuit, February 
28, 2013).
45 Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina’s 
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc (Case No. 12 105 cv(L)) (2d Circuit, December 
28, 2012).
46 Ibid., p. 5.
47 Ibid.
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this strategy, foreign sovereign debt restructuring will become im-
possible48.
Through this argument, the US Government called for the recognition of 
a genuine “international public policy for Sovereign Debt Contracts”49. It was not 
eventually taken into account by the federal court. However, it must be said in its 
defense that it would be extremely difficult for a US court to disregard the pro-
visions of sovereign debt contracts on the basis of new public policy objectives, 
traces of which are found solely in Argentina’s submissions and amicus briefs. 
It is within this framework that some legislative initiatives aimed at limiting en-
forcement actions brought by vulture funds are of special interest in assessing the 
possible recognition of such objectives. 
B. AN INCOMPLETE RECOGNITION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY FOR 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATIONS
1. The Limited Scope of Domestic Legislative Initiatives
The difficulty of barring holdout strategies has made sovereign debt re-
structurings (which may involve private as well as public creditors) more complex 
and have exposed sovereign debtors to the risk of facing several enforcement ac-
tions before domestic courts. In this context, some States whose courts are likely 
to have jurisdiction in sovereign debt disputes have envisaged the adoption of dra-
conian legislation designed to block enforcement procedures brought by private 
creditors50. However, a few of these legislative initiatives were eventually enacted.
The first attempt came from France through a bill “aimed at combating the 
action of vulture funds”. It was first introduced in 200651, then withdrawn and sub-
sequently reintroduced in 2007 in identical terms52. Although this proposal has not 
been adopted, it is particularly informative as to its objective and the legal mech-
anisms that were devised. The explanatory memorandum to the proposal pointed 
out that holdout strategies adversely impact debt reduction and rescheduling agree-
ments negotiated under the auspices of the Paris Club and London Club insofar as 
48 Ibid., p. 3-4.
49 Arguments of the same nature have been developed in the amicus brief filed by the French Republic 
in July 2013 in support of Argentina’s application before the US Supreme Court. This brief points out 
that “[t]he decision of the Court of Appeals threatens wider public interests” and that “the Court of 
Appeals should have addressed the public interest implications of its decision; yet the court did not 
adequately do so, resulting in a ruling that may exacerbate sovereign debt crises and in turn threaten 
international financial stability” (Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of The 
Republic of Argentina’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (No. 12-1494) (July 26, 2013).
50 For an overview, see, WAUTELET, supra note 30, p. 119 et seq.
51 ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, XIIème législature, Proposition de loi de M. Marc Le Fur et de plu-
sieurs de ses collègues visant à lutter contre l’action des fonds financiers dits «fonds vautours», No. 
3214, 28 June 2006.
52 ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, XIIIème législature, Proposition de loi de M. Marc Le Fur visant à 
lutter contre l’action des fonds financiers dits «fonds vautours», No. 131, 2 August 2007.
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debt write-offs de facto benefit recalcitrant creditors53. The objective of the propos-
al was therefore to protect the interests of both debtor States and its public cred-
itors, in particular France because debt reductions involve State expenditure54. In 
this context, the bill suggested that, in the case of an enforcement action aiming at 
recovering a sovereign debt for which a reduction or rescheduling has been grant-
ed by France or one of the international institutions to which it belongs, the court 
may grant the application but only to the extent it considers reasonable by taking 
into account the efforts made by other public and private creditors as well as the 
financial capacity of the sovereign debtor55. The proposal also included a provision 
barring the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in cases where the 
debt arises from speculation56. In substance, this bill, if ever enacted, would have 
established a “public policy for Sovereign Debt Contracts” in France, but it would 
have been limited to States directly or indirectly receiving financial aid by France.
A similar yet unsuccessful proposal was introduced in 200857 (then reintro-
duced in 200958) in the American Congress, strangely entitled “Stop Very Unscru-
pulous Loan Transfers from Underprivileged countries to Rich, Exploitive Funds 
Act” (or “Stop VULTURE Funds Act”). The bill was based on a notion of “Sover-
eign Debt Profiteering” defined as “any act by a vulture creditor seeking, directly or 
indirectly, the payment of part or all of defaulted sovereign debt of a qualified poor 
country, in an amount that exceeds the total amount paid by the vulture creditor to 
acquire the interest of the vulture creditor in the defaulted sovereign debt […], plus 
6 percent simple interest per year […]”59. Like the French proposal, the purpose 
of the planned reform was to block any enforcement action characterized, directly 
or indirectly, as “Sovereign Debt Profiteering”60. It even had criminal law aspects 
since “Sovereign Debt Profiteering” constitutes an offense punishable with a fine 
of an amount equal to the creditor’s claim61. The scope of application of the pro-
posed regulation was limited to the sovereign debt of a “Qualified Poor Country”, 
recognized as such by way of inclusion in a list maintained by the Secretary of the 
Treasury62. Like the French proposal, the aim was to prevent the annihilation of 
the financial efforts made by international financial institutions and creditor States 
within the framework of sovereign debt reduction and rescheduling schemes, in 
particular those conducted under the auspices of the Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid (the proposal pointed out that it was a “mesure de morale et de cohérence dans l’aide aux pays 
amis, notamment en Afrique, tant il serait absurde que l’Exécutif efface d’une main nos créances pour 
que le pouvoir judiciaire accorde de l’autre les sommes rendues disponibles aux usuriers”).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 H.R. 6796 (110th) (August 1, 2008), available at <http://www.govtrack.us>.
58 H.R. 2932 (111th) (June 18, 2009), available at <http://www.govtrack.us>.
59 Stop Vulture Funds Act (supra note 58), Section 3.4. 
60 Stop Vulture Funds Act (supra note 58), Section 5 (“Prohibition on Use of Courts of the United States 
to Further Sovereign Debt Profiteering”).
61Stop Vulture Funds Act (supra note 58), Section 4 (“Prohibitions on Sovereign Debt Profiteering – 
Penalties”).
62 Stop Vulture Funds Act (supra note 58), Section 6 (“Duties of the Department of the Treasury”).
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tries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996 by the IMF and the World Bank63. Besides, 
the explanatory memorandum to the proposal pointed out that:
[at] the same time that the international community has 
been extending debt relief to the poor countries of the world, a new 
form of business has emerged for the purpose of speculating in and 
profiteering from defaulted sovereign debt at the expense of both 
the impoverished citizens of the poor nations and the taxpayers of 
the world who have participated in international debt relief64.
While the initiatives launched in France and the US have stalled at the 
proposal stage, the British project was eventually enacted. A first proposal enti-
tled “Developing Country Debt (Restriction of Recovery) Bill” was introduced 
in 200965 in the wake of the Donegal v. Zambia case, which received extensive 
publicity66. In this case, a British court ordered Zambia to pay the investment fund 
Donegal a sum representing five times the amount the fund had initially paid for 
the acquisition of the debt, which was originally owed by Zambia to Romania67. 
Donegal’s initial claim (fifteen times the amount paid) was even superior to the 
debt relief Zambia was due to receive following an agreement concluded in 2005 
at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles68. The 2009 project was dropped but reintroduced 
in 2010 through the “Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act”69, originally en-
acted for a period of one year due to the absence of an impact assessment study70. 
It is only in 2011 that it had been given permanent effect71. The objective of this 
legislation is to place a cap on the amount that creditors may recover in British 
courts. However, the scope of the statute is limited to a category of “Qualifying 
Debt” for which about forty countries are eligible, qualifying for the World Bank 
and IMF HIPC initiative72.
63 The explanatory memorandum to the proposal (Section 2.5) pointed out that “[a] number of coun-
tries, including the United States, have canceled 100 percent of the bilateral loans made by such coun-
tries to countries that are eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, and other major 
donor nations have canceled a large percentage of such loans”. 
64 Stop Vulture Funds Act (supra note 58), Section 2.6.
65 Developing Country Debt (Restriction of Revovery) Bill, House of Commons, 6 May 2009, available 
at <www.publications.parliament.uk>.
66 On this case, see, LARYEA Thomas, “Donegal v. Zambia and the Persistent Debt Problems of 
Low-Income Countries”, Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 73, 2010, pp. 193-200.
67 Donegal International Ltd v. Zambia [2007] EWHC 197 (Comm), [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397.
68 “‘Vulture’ feeds on Zambia”, The Guardian, 15 February 2007.
69 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, 8 April 2011.
70 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, 8 April 2011, Section 9 (“Duration of Act”).
71 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 (Permanent Effect) Order 2011, No. 1336, 25 May 
2011.
72 Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, 8 April 2011, Section 1 (“Meaning of ‘Qualifying 
Debt’ etc.”).
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2. A Limited Scope Adversely Impacting the Recognition of an Interna-
tional Public Policy
The limited scope of British legislation would have made it applicable to 
Zambia in the Donegal case since the latter country benefited from the HIPC initia-
tive73. However, it would have excluded Argentina, which was not eligible for this 
IMF/World Bank program74. The ambition of the reform was to establish a juris-
dictional shield protecting States receiving financial assistance from international 
institutions involving a direct or indirect contribution from the United Kingdom. 
Apart from the protection of the UK’s own interests, using the HIPC initiative as a 
reference can also be seen as a desire to ensure the proportionality and the objectiv-
ity of a piece of legislation imposing severe restrictions on contractual and property 
rights. Indeed, the list of countries eligible for the HIPC initiative is determined 
according to criteria multilaterally established by Bretton Woods institutions and 
these countries must inter alia face “an unsustainable debt burden that cannot be 
addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms”75. This degree of objectivity 
was not necessarily reached in the French proposal since it would have been ap-
plicable to any sovereign debtor benefiting from a debt reduction or rescheduling 
granted by France. This does not mean in all cases that the debtor faces an unsus-
tainable debt burden not addressable through traditional debt relief mechanisms.
This brief overview of domestic legislative initiatives indicates that a 
“public policy for Sovereign Debt Contracts” is conceivable only if such initia-
tives would be widely implemented in national laws76. However, even in this case, 
some uncertainties would remain about the precise content of this public policy, in 
particular whether it includes all States or only those eligible for the HIPC initia-
tive. At present, it could be argued that the common denominator of these national 
experiences is the goal to protect the financial interests of creditor States and not to 
establish a global mechanism targeting all creditors implementing a holdout strat-
egy. It would therefore be inappropriate to perceive this nascent “public policy” as 
a genuinely international one.
This assessment would change if international institutions were to devel-
op a consistent doctrine on this issue. Debates within the UN77 and the Council 
73 PARIS CLUB, Paris Club Reduces Zambia’s Debt Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 11 May 
2005, available at <www.clubdeparis.org>.
74 The list of countries qualifying for the World Bank and IMF Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative is available at <www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm>.
75 IMF, Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, September 2013, 
available at <www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/hipc.pdf>. See also, IMF, Selected Decisions and 
Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., IMF, 2009, p. 217 (“Direc-
tors agreed that the objective of the enhanced HIPC Initiative is to achieve a lasting exit from unsus-
tainable debt […]” (The Acting Chair’s Summing Up – HIPC Initiative […], Executive Board Meeting 
02/40, 9 April 2002)).
76 We can also mention the 2008 Belgium legislation (see, WAUTELET, supra note 30, p. 124 et seq.). 
It is, however, of a more limited practical relevance since Belgium is not a key forum for vulture funds 
(see, GIANSETTO, supra note 30, p. 56).
77 See, inter alia, the position of an expert appointed by the UN Human Rights Council: “Stop ‘vulture 
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of Europe78 show, however, that while concerns have been raised, no conclusive 
decisions or resolutions have been passed. The only declaration likely to produce 
legal effects was adopted by Paris Club creditors which declared that they were 
“committed to avoid selling their claims on HIPC countries to other creditors who 
do not intend to provide debt relief under the HIPC initiative”79. This commitment 
has therefore a very narrow scope since its objective is to prevent the acquisition 
of distressed sovereign debt for speculative purposes and not to block enforcement 
procedures initiated by litigating creditors before domestic courts.
Finally, it seems too ambitious to infer from both domestic and interna-
tional initiatives the emergence, in the short to medium term, of a genuine interna-
tional public policy applicable to sovereign debt contracts. The possibility of such 
a public policy is not to be precluded but it would involve challenging the precon-
ception that policy objectives are solely externally defined or identified by either 
the legislative or the judicial branch. Indeed, the evolution of sovereign borrowing 
practices shows that the imperatives of an orderly management of sovereign insol-
vencies have been included in debt contracts.
II. THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN INTEGRATED “INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS”
It is of course a truism to recall the non-existence of centralized insol-
vency procedures for sovereigns, although some attempts had been made such as 
the proposal in 1939 for the establishment of an International Loans Tribunal80 or, 
more recently, the initiative launched under the auspices of the IMF to institute a 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)81. The absence of insolven-
funds’ from paralyzing debt-relief efforts, says UN independent expert”, 13 December 2012, available 
at <www.un.org>. See also, UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report of the Independent Expert on 
the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full 
Enjoyment of all Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Cephas Lumina, 
A/HRC/14/21, 29 April 2010.
78 PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Protecting Financial Aid 
Granted by Council of Europe Member States to Poor Countries Against Financial Funds Known as 
‘Vulture Funds’, Doc. 11862, 21 April 2009.
79 PARIS CLUB, Press Release of the Paris Club on the Threats Posed by Some Litigating Creditors to 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, 22 May 2007, available at <www.clubdeparis.org>.
80 WAIBEL Michael, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge/New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 324 et seq.
81 KRUEGER Anne O., A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Washington DC, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2002, 40 p. The architect of the SDRM, the economist and former First Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, Anne O. Krueger, intervened in the NML v. Argentina litigation through 
the submission of an amicus curiae brief in which she pointed out: 
[i]f sovereigns were required […] to repay holdout creditors […], there would be sev-
eral negative effects. These would include: (l) the increased reluctance of creditors to 
share in any restructuring and hence an increase in the likelihood and number of hold-
outs; (2) higher interest costs for all sovereign borrowers; (3) a reduction in capital 
inflows even for countries with sound macroeconomic policies; (4) increased delays 
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cy procedures has favored the emergence of informal restructuring mechanisms 
based on the voluntary participation of various stakeholders, among them the “Par-
is Club” and the “London Club”82. 
The development of sovereign bond markets has led to an increase in pri-
vate creditors, particularly bondholders that were not represented in existing insti-
tutions. This fragmentation of creditors, with sometimes diverging interests, has 
reduced the incentives for cooperative strategies among private creditors and be-
tween private creditors and other stakeholders (sovereign debtors, public creditors, 
etc.). This lack of organization has fostered the development of holdout strategies 
likely to impact existing restructuring mechanisms. As a result, a demand has de-
veloped for a greater cohesion between bondholders. Among the different mecha-
nisms that have been considered, the development of “Collective Action Clauses” 
(CACs) in sovereign debt contracts deserve special attention (A.). In the wake of 
the euro area sovereign debt crisis, it is also necessary to examine the mandatory 
inclusion of CACs in bond issues under the new European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) (B.).
A. AN INCOMPLETE RECOGNITION OF A DE FACTO “INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS” 
THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES (CACS)
1. The regulatory function of CACs
There are different types of CACs in bond issues83: clauses establishing a 
mechanism for the collective representation of bondholders (“collective represen-
tation clauses”), clauses empowering a qualified majority of bondholders to modify 
the terms of a bond contract (“majority action clauses” or “qualified majority vot-
ing clauses”), clauses requiring that any litigating creditor has to share any amounts 
recovered with other bondholders (“sharing clauses”), or clauses preventing bond-
holders from demanding early repayment in the event of a default unless a certain 
percentage of bondholder (usually 25%) accepts this initiative (“non-acceleration 
clauses”)84. Among these various types of CACs, the second category (“majority 
action clauses”) is particularly useful in the context of a sovereign debt restructur-
ing process. Indeed, they allow a qualified majority of bondholders (usually 75%) 
to modify the terms of payment of a bond contract (principal, interest, maturity, 
by sovereigns before accepting the need for restructuring […]; and (5) issues for the 
International Monetary Fund in supporting countries where policy reform could lead 
to a return to debt sustainability and voluntary debt-servicing if debt were restruc-
tured” (Brief for Amicus Curiae Professor Anne Krueger in Support of the Republic 
of Argentina and Reversal (Case No. 12 105 cv(L)) (2d Circuit, January 4, 2013)).
82 See supra I.-A.-1.
83 For an in-depth study, see, CHOI, GULATI, POSNER, supra note 18, p. 140 et seq.
84 OLIVARES-CAMINAL Rodrigo et al., Debt Restructuring, Oxford/New York, New York Universi-
ty Press, 2011, p. 434; DIXON Liz, WALL David, “Collective Action Problems and Collective Action 
Clauses”, Financial Stability Review, June 2000, p. 143.
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etc.)85 against the will of a minority, thereby neutralizing holdout strategies.
While CACs have improved restructuring procedures, this mechanism is 
not without deficiencies. Litigating creditors unwilling to participate in negotia-
tions might purchase new bonds in order to constitute a blocking minority pre-
venting an amendment to the bond contract86. Moreover, absent an “aggregation 
clause” ensuring the consolidation of collective action clauses, CACs only operate 
bond-by-bond which implies that the debtor must separately convince every class 
of bondholders87. This is all the more complex when the sovereign debt stock is 
comprised of bonds issued in different markets and currencies. This was the case 
in Argentina, which issued more than 150 types of bonds across eight jurisdictions 
and in seven currencies88, rendering unrealistic the conclusion of a comprehensive 
agreement among all creditors. Although CACs usually specify that bonds held 
by the issuer or entities under its control are excluded from voting89, bondholders 
may also fear abuses related to creditors remotely controlled by the State influenc-
ing the restructuring by agreeing to substantial haircuts90. These risks must not be 
disregarded but are more than offset by the predictability and stability provided by 
CACs included in sovereign debt contracts. Besides, studies show that CACs have 
not raised the cost of borrowing for sovereign States91.
Therefore, CACs can contribute to the improved regulation of sovereign 
insolvencies as long as this mechanism is applicable to a significant proportion of 
sovereign bonds. The challenge, therefore, is to ensure the systematic inclusion of 
CACs in sovereign borrowing practices, since it is not possible, at least theoret-
ically, to retroactively insert them in sovereign bond contracts92. It is within this 
framework that international initiatives aimed at the promotion of CACs deserve 
to be mentioned. 
85 OLIVARES-CAMINAL et al., supra note 84, p. 438; DIXON, WALL, supra note 84, p. 144.
86 BUCHHEIT Lee. C., GULATI Mitu, “Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will”, Emory Law Jour-
nal, vol. 51, 2002, p. 1344.
87 Id.
88 SCHIER Holger, Towards a Reorganisation System for Sovereign Debt – An International Law 
Perspective, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007, p. 30.
89 HÄSELER Sönke, “Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bonds”, in KOLB Robert W. (ed.), 
Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default, Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons, 2011, p. 238.
90 DIXON, WALL, supra note 84, p. 144-145.
91 BRADLEY Michael, COX James D., GULATI Mitu, “The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and 
Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market”, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 39, 2010, p. 
301; HÄSELER, supra note 89, p. 240. See, however, contra, EICHENGREEN Barry, MODY Asho-
ka, “Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?”, The Economic Journal, n° 114, 2004, p. 
247 et seq. (concluding (p. 262) that: “[w]e conjecture that more credit-worthy borrowers benefit from 
being able to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process, since investors find the availability 
of this orderly process attractive, while for less credit-worthy borrowers the advantages of provisions 
facilitating an orderly restructuring are offset by the moral hazard and additional default risk associated 
with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions”).
92 The Greek experience being an exception (see infra II.-B.-1).
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2. The International Promotion of CACs
Until recently, there has been no established practice of including CACs 
in bonds issued under New York Law, unlike the London financial center where 
CACs have been common market practice in corporate bonds since the end of the 
nineteenth century93. The absence of this practice in the US mainly results from the 
regulations that apply to corporations. Indeed, the 1939 Trust Indenture Act94 pro-
hibited the reduction of payments of the principal and interest without the consent 
of every affected bondholder95. While the Trust Indenture Act was not applicable 
to sovereign bonds, it generated a standardization of contractual practices across 
the whole bond market and consequently amendment clauses included in sovereign 
bonds issued in the United States followed the approach applicable to corporate 
bonds. This practice persisted until the end of the nineties, generating an asymme-
try between the two major financial centers, since a particular amendment of bond 
terms required a qualified majority vote in London and a unanimous one in New 
York96. 
Only since 2003 has the practice of CACs started to become widespread 
in New York, slightly less than ten years after the first recommendations that were 
made in the wake of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis97. At the Halifax Summit held 
in June 1995, the G7 gave the G10 a mandate to explore possible procedures for 
the orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises98. A working group established un-
der the auspices of the G10 published its report in May 1996 (the “Rey Report”)99 
which recommended to this end the systematic inclusion of CACs in sovereign 
bond issues insofar as such clauses “promote cohesion among creditors and reduce 
the incentive for, or ability of, a small number of dissident creditors to disrupt, 
delay or prevent arrangements supporting a credible adjustment program that are 
acceptable to the vast majority of the interested parties”100. Apart from “collective 
representation clauses” and “sharing clauses”101, this report also pointed out the 
utility of “qualified majority voting clauses” that “could be expected to facilitate 
the workout process in the event of a sovereign liquidity crisis, since they limit 
93 OLIVARES-CAMINAL et al., supra note 84, p. 435; BUCHHEIT, GULATI, supra note 86, p. 
1324-1325.
94 BUCHHEIT, GULATI, supra note 86, p. 1326-1330.
95 15 USC § 77ppp(b) (pointing out that “[…] the right of any holder of any indenture security to re-
ceive payment of the principal of and interest […] shall not be impaired or affected without the consent 
of such holder”)
96 For more details, see, BUCHHEIT, GULATI, supra note 86, p. 1329.
97 On this episode, see, RIEFFEL, supra note 26, p. 188 et seq.
98 G7, Halifax Summit Communiqué, 16 June 1995, § 20 (“recognizing the complex legal and other 
issues posed in debt crisis situations by the wide variety of sources of international finance involved, we 
would encourage further review by G-10 Ministers and Governors of other procedures that might also 
usefully be considered for their orderly resolution”).
99 The working group was headed by Jean-Jacques Rey of the National Bank of Belgium
100 G10, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises – A Report to the Ministers and Governors Pre-
pared Under the Auspices of the Deputies, May 1996, § 53, available at <www.bis.org>.
101 Id., § 55-56 and 60-61.
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the scope for a small minority of creditors to stall or block the process”102. It also 
briefly explained – implicitly mentioning the United States – that the asymmetry 
between London and other financial centers with respect to these clauses was due 
to a “lack of familiarity with such clauses in their national context”103. Being aware 
that a mandatory inclusion of CACs through domestic legislation or an internation-
al treaty was not conceivable, the Rey Report advocated the involvement of the 
private sector in order to promote their adoption104.
The wishes expressed by the G10, reiterated in greater detail in 2002105, 
did not have a direct impact on the US bond market but it constituted the starting 
point for several initiatives to promote the inclusion of CACs106. The US Treasury, 
and in particular one of its officials, John B. Taylor, had been very active from 
the early 2000s in attempting to convince market participants in the US107. The 
IMF also recommended such clauses108 but refused to subject its financial assis-
tance to the insertion of CACs by countries in their sovereign bond issues109. The 
IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) project, led by Anne 
Krueger110, also had a decisive impact. Indeed, through the SDRM, it was intend-
ed to establish a supranational regime to address sovereign insolvencies and, as 
this option was perceived as too radical for both borrowers and private creditors, 
CACs appeared “as the lesser of two evils”111. In this respect, it is indicative that 
the SDRM was abandoned in the spring of 2003 at the same time CACs were 
beginning to become common practice in New York, particularly after Mexico’s 
decision to include CACs in its sovereign bonds issued under New York law in 
February 2003112.
102 Id., § 57.
103 Id., § 59.
104 Id., § 62-65.
105 G10, Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses, 26 September 2002, available 
at <www.bis.org>.
106 See also the following study which had a profound influence over this debate: EICHENGREEN 
Barry, PORTES Richard, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, London, Cen-
tre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.
107 TAYLOR John B., Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective, Speech at the Conference 
“Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards”, Institute for International Economics, 2 April 2002. 
See also, SCHIER, supra note 88, p. 26.
108 IMF, Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts – Encouraging Greater Use, 6 June 
2002, available at <www.imf.org>; IMF, The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses, 6 
June 2002, available at <www.imf.org>.
109 IMF, IMF Board Discusses Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts, PIN No. 02/77, 
26 July 2002 (underlining that “[d]irectors also did not support amending the Fund’s Articles to require 
that members of the Fund use collective action clauses” but that “[t]here was general agreement that 
any efforts to encourage the use of clauses would be most effective if supported by intensified efforts 
outside the Fund”).
110 See supra note 81.
111 GELPERN Anna, GULATI Mitu, “Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study”, Washington 
University Law Review, vol. 84, 2006, p. 1642-1643 and 1649 et seq.
112 SCHIER, supra note 88, p. 34; OLIVARES-CAMINAL et al., supra note 84, p. 438; GELPERN, 
GULATI, supra note 111, p. 1641; CHOI, GULATI, POSNER, supra note 18, p. 162.
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The now-widespread use of CACs in all major financial centers for for-
eign sovereign bond issues113 thus attests to the development of an integrated de 
facto “public policy for sovereign debt contracts”. The euro area debt crisis and 
the new treaty establishing a European Stability Mechanism have paved the way 
for how the recognition of such public policy could evolve towards a de jure one.
B. CACS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF AN INTEGRATED DE JURE 
“PUBLIC POLICY FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS” IN THE EURO 
AREA
1. The Retroactive Insertion of CACs in the Context of the Greek Debt 
Restructuring
The consolidation of CACs in market practices should have led to a de-
crease in the proportion of the stock of sovereign debt without collective action 
mechanisms, thereby minimizing the risks of holdout strategies. This trend holds 
true for the sovereign debt issued by emerging and developing countries and, be-
sides, the Argentina’s debt litigation in New York courts involved bonds issued 
before 2003 without CACs114. The difficulty in restructuring the Greek debt should 
thus come as a surprise. 
A brief study of this crisis shows, however, that holdout strategies have 
not been anticipated in all Greek bonds115. While the debate on CACs focused on 
the US market, less attention was given to the contractual terms of EU countries’ 
sovereign debt because of the apparent resilience of the euro area. Besides, EU 
institutions and Member States have not shown considerable interest in this issue. 
The European Central Bank lauded the development of CACs but seemed to im-
ply that they were only useful for emerging countries116. Likewise, in 2002, EU 
member states committed themselves to introducing CACs in their international 
sovereign bond issues117 but not in their domestic ones. These developments were 
not motivated by a global strategy to prevent possible sovereign debt crises but re-
113 It is necessary to point out that differences remain in the drafting of such clauses. See, DRAGE 
John, HOVAGUIMIAN Catherine, Collective Action Clauses (CACs): An Analysis of Provisions In-
cluded in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, Bank of England, 2 November 2004, 27 p., available at <www.
bankofengland.co.uk>.
114 See supra I.A.2.
115 For a general overview of the Greek debt crisis, see, MITSOPOULOS Michael, PELAGIDIS The-
odore, Understanding the Crisis in Greece – From Boom to Bust, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011.
116 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, “Crisis Resolution in Emerging Market Economies – Challenges 
for the International Community”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2003, p. 67 et seq.
117 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Rapport Annuel 2003, p. 135. This commitment was made at 
an informal Ecofin council meeting in Copenhagen and was publicly reiterated at an Ecofin Meet-
ing in 2003: 2537th Council meeting – Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 4 November 2003, 
C/03/306, 13689/03 (“Ministers reiterated their commitment to include Collective Action Clauses in all 
their international sovereign bond issues and stated that they would expect new Member States to follow 
up on this commitment”).
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flected more “an effort to lead by example”118 and to demonstrate that CACs do not 
raise the cost of borrowing119. The EU approach, solely focusing on international 
sovereign bond issues, has generated a blind spot insofar as euro-denominated 
bonds issued on domestic markets (for instance French bonds issued in euros in the 
French domestic market) were not covered by the commitment to include CACs. 
The difficulties encountered within the framework of the Greek debt re-
structuring actually stem from the asymmetry in contract policies between do-
mestic and international sovereign bond issues. Indeed, approximately 90% of 
Greek bonds issued between 2003 and 2010 were issued on the Greek market, 
without CACs and governed by Greek law, the rest being issued in London in 
euros or on other foreign markets in other currencies (US Dollars, Swiss Francs, 
etc.), usually with CACs120. Given the structure of Greek debt and the absence of 
a collective action mechanism for the vast majority of Greek bonds, the unavoid-
able restructuring would have obviously faced a high risk of failure since at least 
a fringe of recalcitrant bondholders would have refused to agree to a voluntary 
haircut on their loans121. Greece opted for an original strategy in order to defuse 
this “time-bomb” by adopting in February 2012 a legislation (also labeled as the 
“Mopping-Up Law”)122 authorizing the retroactive inclusion of CACs in Greek 
bonds issued under Greek law. This permitted the acceptance of an offer through a 
qualified majority vote to exchange Greek-law bonds for new bonds issued under 
English Law123. 
The retroactive modification of the terms of payment has a confiscatory 
effect for bondholders not accepting the exchange. It was obvious and probably 
expected by Greek authorities that some creditors would challenge this measure 
before the European Court of Rights (ECtHR) or an investment arbitration tribu-
nal124. A Slovakian bank holding Greek bonds and one of its shareholders based in 
Cyprus filed an arbitration claim against Greece, arguing that the exchange follow-
118 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, Rapport Annuel 2003, p. 135 (“In the course of 2003 there was 
significant progress towards a more widespread inclusion of CACs in sovereign bonds issued under 
foreign jurisdictions. In an effort to lead by example, the EU Member States committed themselves to 
including such CACs in their relevant issues”).
119 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, Annual Report 2002, p. 103.
120 DAS Udaibir S., PAPAIOANNOU Michael G., TREBESCH Christoph, Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/203, Au-
gust 2012, p. 42-44; BUCHHEIT Lee C., GULATI Mitu, “Restructuring a Nation’s Debt”, Internation-
al Financial Law Review, June 2010, p. 46.
121 ZETTELMEYER, TREBESCH, GULATI, supra note 2, p. 26.
122 BUCHHEIT, GULATI, supra note 121, p. 49.
123 Greek Bondholder Law n° 4050/2012, 23 February 2012. See also, HELLENIC REPUBLIC – 
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, Press Release, 24 February 2012; ZETTELMEYER, TREBESCH, GU-
LATI, supra note 2, p. 25; BANK FOR INTERATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, “Governing Law and the 
Greek Debt Restructuring”, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2012, p. 67.
124 BOUDREAU Melissa A., “Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are Retrofit Collec-
tive Action Clauses Expropriatory?”, Harvard Business Law Review Online, vol. 2, 2012, p. 164 et seq. 
See also, GLINAVOS Ioannis, “Investors vs. Greece – The Greek ‘Haircut’ and Investor Arbitration 
under BIT’s”, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com> (to be published in: Redefining the Market-State 
Relationship – Responses to the Financial Crisis and the Future of Regulation, Routledge).
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ing the “Mopping-Up Law” decreased the value of their investments and consti-
tuted a breach of Greek-Slovak and Greek-Cypriot bilateral investment treaties125. 
Some Greek and Italian bondholders also lodged an application against Greece be-
fore the ECtHR126 for violation of the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). They also claimed 
a violation of the right to non-discrimination under ECHR Article 14, particularly 
because the exchange had been carried out in a discriminatory manner, by applying 
different conditions according to the nationality of the bondholders or the size of 
their investment127.
While the outcome of these cases is uncertain and the issue of compati-
bility with ECHR Article 14 seems particularly serious, it is still conceivable that 
the ECtHR could pay attention to the arguments that could possibly be raised by 
Greece. Firstly, the Greek “Mopping-Up Law” was not in itself confiscatory or 
discriminatory but only permitted the exchange adopted by a qualified majority of 
bondholders, the latter decision not being attributable to Greece128. Secondly, the 
dire economic context must be taken into consideration according to the ECtHR 
case law. In Dennis Grainger et al. v. United Kingdom129, shareholders in Northern 
Rock complained that the lack of compensation following the nationalization of 
the bank by British authorities in 2008 constituted a breach of ECHR Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1. The Court dismissed the case as manifestly ill-founded and inad-
missible because it recognized that “the Government should be afforded a wide 
margin of appreciation in this case, since the impugned action arose in the context 
of macro-economic policy”130. It also pointed out that “given the exceptional cir-
cumstances prevailing in the financial sector, both domestically and internationally, 
at the relevant time, a wide margin of appreciation is appropriate”131 and concluded 
that in this context “the Court must respect the decisions of the national authorities 
125 Poštová banka, a.s. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8. See, 
“Slovak Bank Files Suit Against Greece Over Forced Bond Swap”, Czech News Agency, 7 May 2013.
126 A website (<http://greekbond-legalactions.eu>) developed by the lawyers who filed this complaint 
mentions the ECtHR Application Number No. 26055/12. 
127 Ibid. (arguing a violation of ECHR Article 14:
because the swap of Greek Government bonds resulting into the deprivation of prop-
erty complained of has been carried out in a discriminatory manner, namely applying 
different conditions based on the nationality of the bondholders or treating similarly 
situations which were significantly different”). This was true in the case of the invest-
ment fund Dart Management which purchased English-Law distressed Greek bonds 
at prices estimated to be between 60% to 70% of the face value. It eventually received 
full payment by the Greek government whereas other bondholders took a 75% loss 
within the framework of the restructuring (“Bet on Greek Bonds Paid Off for ‘Vulture 
Fund’”, New York Times, 15 May 2012).
128 See, WAUTELET Patrick, “The Greek Debt Restructuring and Property Rights A Greek Tragedy 
for Investors?”, in Mélanges Marc Bossuyt, Intersentia (forthcoming 2014).
129 ECtHR, 20 July 2012, Application No. 34940/10, Dennis Grainger and others against the United 
Kingdom.
130 Ibid, § 39.
131 Ibid.
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unless it finds them to be ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’”132.
In the Greek case, the ECtHR could adopt a similar approach, thereby val-
idating the retroactive inclusion of CACs in Greek-law bonds. In substance, such 
a solution would be a recognition of a de jure “public policy for sovereign debt 
contracts” aimed at an orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.
2. The inclusion of CACs in the new European Stability Mechanism
Assuming that the Strasbourg court concludes that Greek measures were 
compatible with the ECHR, it should not be inferred that they could be repeated in 
the future for another debt crisis in the euro area. Such stopgap initiatives generate 
legal risks but also send negative signals to the markets and adversely affect the 
credibility of both the euro and EU institutions. In this respect, it is noteworthy to 
mention that in the Greek restructuring, swapping Greek-law bonds for new En-
glish-law bonds made sure that “bondholders who had just experienced the power 
of the local legislature to change contract provisions retroactively […] would find 
some comfort in the fact that in the event of a new restructuring English law bonds 
would preclude a change of their contractual rights through the channel of legis-
lative fiat”133.
In order to improve the predictability and guarantee the legal certainty 
of any future possible debt restructuring at the European level, a more perennial 
and robust framework for the management of financial crises has been established 
through the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which 
was adopted in February 2012 and replaced the temporary European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM). The European Council in March 2011 – before the adoption of the ESM 
Treaty – stressed that its objective was to ensure the inclusion of CACs “consistent 
with those commonly used in the US and the UK markets since the G10 report 
on CACs” 134. According to the Council, it “implies the use of identical and stan-
dardised clauses for all euro area Member States, harmonised in the terms and con-
ditions of securities issued by the Members States. Their basis will be consistent 
with the CACs that are common in New York and English law” 135.
The ESM Treaty136 makes the inclusion of CACs in the euro area com-
pulsory to prevent the complications encountered in the Greek case where no col-
lective mechanism was available for bonds issued on the domestic market. In this 
132 Ibid.
133 ZETTELMEYER, TREBESCH, GULATI, supra note 2, p. 25 (“Greek law bondholders who had 
just experienced the power of the local legislature to change contract provisions retroactively […] 
would find some comfort in the fact that in the event of a new restructuring English law bonds would 
preclude a change of their contractual rights through the channel of legislative fiat”). See also, CHOI, 
GULATI, POSNER, supra note 18, p. 139-140.
134 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Conclusions, EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1, Annex II (Term Sheet on the ESM), 
24-25 March 2011, available at <www.consilium.europa.eu>.
135 Ibid.
136 For more details, see, ALLEMAND, MARTUCCI, supra note 13, p. 407 et seq.
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respect, the new treaty provides that “[c]ollective action clauses shall be included, 
as of 1 January 2013, in all new euro area government securities, with maturity 
above one year, in a way which ensures that their legal impact is identical” 137. This 
requirement constitutes an important change for some euro area countries consid-
ered to be more robust (including France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Neth-
erlands) since their model contracts for domestic issues did not include CACs138 
and were only limited to key financial terms (interest rate, amount, maturity)139. 
This new treaty obligation thus places a limitation on the freedom of contract and 
is non-derogable, thereby giving substance to a “public policy for sovereign debt 
contracts” for the member states of the euro area. 
***
The decision to make CACs mandatory through the ESM Treaty has been 
made within the specific context of a euro area seeking a more advanced econom-
ic, monetary and financial form of governance. While it is unlikely that a similar 
obligation could be reproduced in a broader multilateral setting, the “legalization” 
of CACs has already started through their progressive inclusion in sovereign debt 
contracts and their recognition by States and international institutions. This pro-
cess, joining the practice and the opinio juris, reflects the crystallization of a rule of 
international customary law as well as the recognition of an international “public 
policy for sovereign debt contracts”. It could potentially lead domestic and inter-
national tribunals to take into consideration the overriding objective of an orderly 
resolution of sovereign debt crises in order to effectively address the problem of 
holdouts in the absence of collective action mechanism. Undoubtedly, the argu-
ment should be raised within the framework of the litigation arising out of the 
unprecedented Greek debt restructuring.
137 MES Treaty, Article 12.3.
138 CHOI, GULATI, POSNER, supra note 18, p. 153.
139 Ibid., p. 133.
